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Abstract—In this paper we introduce a methodology to create
multilayered terrorist networks, taking into account that the
main challenges of the data behind the networks are incom-
pleteness, fuzzy boundaries, and dynamic behavior. To account
for these dark networks’ characteristics, we use knowledge
sharing communities in determining the methodology to create
3-layered networks from each of our datasets. We analyze
the resulting layers of three terrorist datasets and present
explanations of why three layers should be used for these
models. We also use the information of just one layer, to identify
the Bali 2005 attack community.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The current research considers how attribute enriched
data about terrorist organizations can be aggregated in order
to (1) be effectively used as a network, and (2) gain an
understanding of the groups of people in it. Since most
terrorist networks work hard to hide their interactions, the
data must be modeled in an appropriate type of the network
in order for it to be useful.
There are many difficulties associated with mapping and
analyzing dark networks. Krebs [1] uses the September 11th
2001 terrorist attack in the United States as a case study
in dark network mapping and analysis. He describes three
challenges previously identified by Sparrow [2] that are
specifically associated with mapping and analyzing criminal
social networks: 1. incompleteness, 2. fuzzy boundaries, and
3. dynamic behavior.
The resiliency of a dark network is qualitatively described
by Krebs [1] as strong due to the high redundancy of
trust relationships which includes classmates, kinship, or
participating in terrorist related training and operations. This
highlights the differences between social network and covert
network. The classification of relationships as strong or
weak ties is entirely dependent on the type of network
being analyzed. For dark networks, trusted prior contacts
is typically considered a strong tie between two vertices
whereas the two people connected by the same nationality
could be viewed as a weak tie. The strong tie clearly
emphasizes a close relationship, whereas a weak tie viewed
by itself may offer only ambiguity on the relationship
status. Analysis of strong ties in social networks usually
produces the “cluster of network players” [1]. However,
network players in dark networks may visibly appear to
only have weak ties [1]. Everton [3] supports the claim
that an optimal combination of both weak and strong ties
is ideal for dark network analysis. This claim highlights the
notion that multiple relationships of data must be included
when analyzing the network. The incomplete and secret
nature of dark networks requires weak ties to help illuminate
potentially hidden strong ties.
Krebs offers a strategy for disrupting terrorist networks
through information aggregation and knowledge sharing.
Under this strategy, the key vertices to target in a network are
vertices with unique skills and vertices that have deep rooted
trust relationships with other groups. For more information
on understanding dark networks and using topological char-
acteristics to disrupt them see [4].
Krebs and Sparrow emphasize the sparse nature of dark
networks and in turn, Taylor et al. [5] suggest aggregating
similar relationships into categories selective on relationship
choices. They bring the awareness against the dangers of too
many relationships and redundancy. Didier et al. [6] present
problems associated with aggregating relationships.
The research highlighted here serve as the foundational
understanding and inspiration that enabled us to develop our
methodology for obtaining information from data, by creat-
ing multilayered terrorist networks. We propose methodol-
ogy to create networks from three existing terrorist data with
the goal of making these knowledge sharing communities
(KSC) evident, while addressing the sparsity of the terrorist
networks.
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We present a methodology that creates meaningful mul-
tilayered terrorist networks based on the data tagged with
attributes between the individuals. We show how too many
layers may not be the best option as they are incomplete and
too sparse. Similarly, collapsing all the layers into a single
network without differentiating between the edge type is also
not desired, as the information between strong and weak ties
is lost, and it makes the communities boundaries blurred.
Our methodology produces synthetic layers of multilayered
networks with the goal of identifying KSC.
We present an analysis of these networks at different
granularity levels, and we further emphasize the commu-
nities obtained in each case. We validate the proposed
methodology by analyzing the KSC communities obtained
and comparing them to the ones obtained by randomly
combining 3, 4 and 5 layers. We also present an application
that focuses on identifying targeted communities based on
the Bali attack of 2005.
II. COMMUNITY METRICS
We first present methods used to quantify community
detection. We use these metrics to compare different com-
munity structures obtained using Louvain method [7], by
varying the combinations of attributions.
A. Community Quality Metrics
We use two metrics to measure the quality of the com-
munity detection:










where m is the number of edges in the network, Ai j = 1
if (i, j) is an edge and 0 otherwise, ki (and k j) is the
degree of node i (and j), δi j = 1 if both i and j are in
the same community and 0 otherwise [8].
2) Cluster adequacy (Q′), normalizes graph modularity,
Q, by dividing the measured Q by the best possible
Q for a given number of communities, m. The best
possible Q is determined as a function of the number






where Q is the best possible modularity, and
comm count is the number of communities for the
measured Q.
Looking purely at the measured Q, it is possible to mis-
takenly conclude that the communities are mediocre quality.
However, by comparing the measured value of Q to the
best possible modularity for a given number of communities,
cluster adequacy reveals that the community quality is much
higher.
Cluster adequacy favors a uniform distribution of vertices
into equal sized communities, which is rarely possible in real
networks. Orman et al. [10] argue that similar to a degree
distribution, community size tends to follow a power-law
distribution as well.
B. Metrics for Comparing Two Community Partitions
There are several metrics used to compare two networks’
communities, each having its own benefits, none of them
being the standard. They all build on the confusion ma-
trix of two partitions Pa and Pb each of the two net-
works/subnetworks. The confusion matrix displays counts
of the number of nodes in common to each set in the
partition Pa to each set in the partition Pb. The four metrics,
Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) [11], [12], Purity (or
fraction of correctly classified vertices) [13], [14], Rand In-
dex [15] and Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) [16], [17] combine
the elements of the confusion matrix differently, producing
a value in the interval [0,1], with the understanding that
closer the value is to 1 more similar the two partitions Pa
and Pb are. While we present the values for each of these
metrics, we also use the sum of four metrics to capture the
contribution of each of them.
We used the four metrics to compare the quality of
identified communities and their formal definitions are:



























where nabi, j the vertices identified by the algorithm to
be in community i in Pa while they are in a different
community j in Pb.
2) Purity identifies the likely community counterparts in
two separate network partitions based on the idea that
a community in Pa corresponds to the community in
Pb with the highest number of mutual nodes [13].







max j|nai ∩nbj |, (4)
where the purity is found by summing the maximum
values of the for each row (or column) of the confusion
matrix.





where a is the number of node pairs that are int he
same community in Pa and Pb, while b is the number
of pairs that are in different communities in Pa and Pb,
n is the number of nodes in the network.
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(a) Boko Haram (b) FARC (c) Noordin
Fig. 1: The three networks’ weighted degree distribution.
where RI is the Rand Index and E[RI] is the expected
value of RI.
Since a combination of these metrics captures the compari-
son of two community partitions, we combine them into a
single value to guide the conclusions of our analysis:
ARPN = ARI+RandIndex+Purity+NMI. (7)
III. DATA DESCRIPTION
Our methodology is general for multiple attribute terrorist
data, but for the purposes of this research, three small, real,
and dark multiplex network case studies were examined:
• Boko Haram Terrorist Network data set contains 44
vertices,
• FARC Terrorist Network data set contains 142 vertices,
• Noordin Top Network data set containing 133 vertices,
with the respective edges presented in the Tables I-III.
The degree distributions of the three networks are pre-
sented in Figure 1. Each edge is a particular type of
correlation/interaction relationship between terrorists. Each
type of relationship gives rise to a relationship subnetwork
summarized in the rows of Tables I, II and III. We use these
tables as baseline in our comparison, as each of them would
be an easy default for a layer in multilayered networks.
We only use some of the attributes as relationships, as
the other ones either were classified as weak and redundant
or irrelevant attributes. We will propose three consistent
categories/layers for each network in SectionV. The corre-
lated relationships are colored based on the one of the three
categories for an easy of correlating the relationships that
form different layers.
We follow them with a global overview of the networks
presented at the relationship level. The attributes were tagged
in the original data, and for each used attribute we create
a relationship subnetwork: capturing the Total Number of
Vertices of degree greater than 0 (V), Total Number of
Edges (E), Average Degree (AD), Average Weighted Degree
(AWD), Network Diameter (Di), Graph Density (De), Mod-
ularity (M), Average Clustering Coefficient (ACC), Average
Path Length (APL), and Number of Partitioned Components
(P) for each relationship.
A. Boko Haram Terrorist Network
The Boko Haram Terrorist Network contains the relation-
ship information of 44 terrorists that belong to an Islamic
sect that primarily operates in northern Nigeria since 2002.
According to Walker [18], the group believes the current
government in Nigeria is corrupted by false Muslims. The
network is extremely sparse due to its relatively young cell-
like structure, and lack of collective leadership. This network
dataset was created by Cunningham [19] using a variety
of open source documents. We re-organized the available
relationship data into edge lists to build 9 separate layers
for the case study on the Boko Haram Terrorist Network.
TABLE I: Boko Haram Network topological characteristics
by relationship subnetwork.
Relationship Name V E AD AWD Di De M ACC APL P
Colleagues 9 8 1.78 1.78 4 0.22 0.41 0.00 2.33 1
Kinship 6 3 1.00 1.00 1 0.20 0.67 NA 1.00 3
Superior 18 17 1.89 1.89 3 0.11 0.54 0.18 1.93 4
Supporter 5 3 1.20 1.20 2 0.30 0.44 0.00 1.25 2
Financial Ties 2 1 1.00 1.00 1 1.00 0.00 NA 1.00 1
Communication 2 1 1.00 1.00 1 1.00 0.00 NA 1.00 1
Membership 14 32 2.71 4.57 2 0.21 0.30 0.93 1.34 4
Shared Events 16 21 2.63 2.63 2 0.18 0.40 0.81 1.22 5
Collaboration 13 13 2.00 2.00 7 0.17 0.47 0.35 2.84 2
Average 9 11 1.69 1.90 3 0.38 0.36 0.38 1.55 3
B. FARC Terrorist Network
The FARC Terrorist Network data set includes the rela-
tionship information of 142 terrorists known as the Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia that primarily oper-
ates in Columbia and Venezuela since 1964. According to
Weimann [20], the organization believes in Marxist ideology
and seeks to overthrow the Colombian government. The
network is sparse for most layers, but has a well-documented
hierarchical structural layer due to social media [20]. This
network data set was created by Cunningham et al. [21]
using a variety of open source documents. We re-organized
the available relationship data into edge lists to build 10
separate layers for the case study on the FARC Terrorist
Network.
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TABLE II: FARC Network topological characteristics by
relationship subnetwork.
Relationship Name V E AD AWD Di De M ACC APL P
Friendship 2 1 1.00 1.00 1 1.00 0.00 NA 1.00 1
Kinship 8 8 2.00 2.00 1 0.29 0.41 1.00 1.00 3
Superior 17 12 1.41 1.41 2 0.09 0.74 0.00 1.52 5
Supporter 3 2 1.33 1.33 2 0.67 0.00 0.00 1.33 1
Lovers 8 4 1.00 1.00 1 0.14 0.75 NA 1.00 4
Radicalizer 2 1 1.00 1.00 1 1.00 0.00 NA 1.00 1
Communication 9 7 1.56 1.56 4 0.19 0.46 0.00 2.23 2
Meetings 17 30 3.53 3.53 3 0.22 0.43 0.91 1.44 4
Shared Orgs 120 1577 24.6 26.3 4 0.21 0.50 0.95 1.87 5
Collaboration 13 8 1.23 1.23 2 0.10 0.78 0.00 1.27 5
Average 20 165 3.87 4.04 2 .39 .41 .41 1.37 3
C. Noordin Top Terrorist Network
The Noordin Top network data set contains the relation-
ship information of 139 terrorists that belong to five major
parent terrorist organizations operating in Indonesia [22].
The network is named after the key broker, Noordin Top,
who was known for coordinating between terrorist orga-
nizations for training and operations. This network was
primarily developed from the information provided by an
article published by the International Crisis Group in 2006,
Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks [4]. Roberts
et al. [22] used this information to construct a possible
total of 36 attributes. We re-organized the attribute data into
relationships captured by the edge lists to build the layers.
TABLE III: Noordin Network topological characteristics by
relationship subnetwork.
Relationship Name V E AD AWD Di De M ACC APL P
Classmates 44 217 9.32 9.86 7 0.22 0.35 0.76 2.48 1
Kinship 44 49 2.23 2.23 2 0.05 0.87 0.95 1.09 15
Soulmates 13 17 2.62 2.62 2 0.22 0.65 0.89 1.23 3
Friends 83 158 3.71 3.81 9 0.05 0.71 0.55 4.01 3
Mentor Ideological 21 15 1.43 1.43 5 0.07 0.68 0.00 2.03 7
Mentor Supervisory 46 51 2.22 2.22 6 0.05 0.57 0.40 2.50 6
Mentor Technological 13 13 2.00 2.00 5 0.17 0.34 0.00 2.20 2
Recruiting 27 24 1.78 1.78 3 0.07 0.75 0.37 1.78 5
Meetings 33 110 5.33 6.67 4 0.17 0.33 0.84 2.16 1
Communication 120 318 5.30 5.30 8 0.05 0.54 0.53 3.10 1
Logistical Place 34 106 5.71 6.24 3 0.17 0.28 0.83 1.73 5
Operations 60 490 15.63 16.33 2 0.27 0.51 0.94 1.67 4
Training 54 291 9.74 10.78 4 0.18 0.58 0.89 2.33 2
Logistical Function 49 592 22.61 24.16 2 0.47 0.28 0.89 1.53 1
Average 46 175 6.40 6.82 4 0.16 0.53 0.63 2.13 4
IV. EXAMPLE APPLICATIONS OF THE NETWORKS
In this section, we use the information of just one layer
partial information, and compare it to the whole information
of the multilayered network, using community detection.
First, we focus on identifying a community of interest in
Subsection IV-A, and then identify all the communities IV-B.
A. Community of Interest Identification
Three years following the worst attacks in the history
of Indonesia, notorious terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah
(JI) was once again responsible for the bombings in the
beach towns of Kuta and Jimbaran. Three suicide bombers
attacked three different cafes, which claimed the lives of
20 people, including Australian and Japanese nationals.
The prime suspect, who became Indonesia’s most wanted
Islamist militant, was JI’s financier, expert bomb-maker and,
most importantly, the mastermind behind the Bali attacks:
Noordin Mohammad Top [23].
We ran community detection on the Noordin monoplex,
and identified one of the communities to have the individuals
associated with this Bali attack. We call this Bali Community
the Community of Interest (COI) Identification. We wish
to identify this COI, from having access to partial infor-
mation obtained from just the communication layer. The
communication subnetwork contains 20% of the edges of
the monoplex, and 120 of the 139 terrorists. Is the informa-
tion captured in this communication subnetwork enough to
identify the COI in the monoplex?
To pursue this, we run Louvain community detection the
communication subnetwork. We identify the potential COI
in the communication subnetwork and compare it to the real
COI. While Louvain is not a deterministic algorithm, on our
monoplex we get only two very similar partitions, and we
base our analysis on the prevalent one. The only significant
change we found between the two versions is that Noordin
Top was placed different communities in the two versions.
This is because he is connected at such a high degree, and
as reflected in the supporting literature [23] he is a member
of JI (one of the network’s groups), yet coordinates all five
groups.
The COI has comparatively higher clustering coefficient
and is denser than the rest of the communities in the mono-
plex. Thus, we chose the community with the highest density
among all the communities of the communication sub-
network. This successfully identified a community, whose
nodes form a proper subset of the COI’s nodes. The missing
five nodes include three suicide bombers, Salik Firdaus,
Misno, Aip Hidayat, and the recruiter, Jabir. Because of the
process of recruiting suicide bombers [23], these individuals
are not as closely associated with the rest of the actors in the
communication layer, making it hard to detect them. This is
an indication that not only are we able to identify a specific
terrorist cell, but when we compare the results of a single
relationship subnetwork to the results of the monoplex, we
can identify members of the terrorist cell that have different
roles than the majority of the members of the community.
Recall that community detection partitions the node set of
the monoplex into communities based on the edges present.
While the communication subnetwork contains about 20%
of the monoplex’s edge count, we are able to use its structure
to identify the main actors of the COI.
Our COI only appears in three other single relationship
subnetworks. Using the friendship attribute, the relationships
subnetwork has a ten-node community with the same ten
members as the communication subnetwork, the suicide
bombers being excluded from the target community again.
In the operations relationship subnetwork, again we see the
target community identified, and it is larger than the COI.
This community in the operations relationship subnetwork
includes the suicide bombers. Perhaps the most intriguing
relationship is the recruiting attribute: only nine of the ten
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individuals n the COI appear in this community missing Ardi
Wibowo and the suicide bombers. This highlights some of
the inherent qualities of our dark network. We are confident
that Ardi Wibowo is a member of this terrorist organization,
however when we analyze the community structure based
on recruiting, he is absent. The three bombers and their
recruited appear in a separate community of four nodes.
Jabir is a member of the COI, yet he was never identified
as a member of the potential COI in any single relationship
subnetwork.
B. Identifying All Communities from Partial Information
We now expand our process by trying to identify all the
communities in the monoplex just from the communities in
the subnetwork of each attribute. We evaluate each of the
relationships subnetworks, to see how well each relationship
individually can be used to determine the community struc-
ture of the full network. We will use the cluster adequacy,
to evaluate how strong the community structure is in each
relationship subnetwork. The higher the value, the better
community structure we have.
We also use NMI/Purity/ARI/Rand Index to see how
similar the community structure in a particular relationship
subnetwork is to the one in the monoplex. We desire
values close to 1, showing that a layer captures significant
information of the monoplex. These results are presented in
Tables IV, V and VI, for each of the three networks.
Relationship Comty. ARI Rand Purity Assty. NMI Clr. Adq.
Colleagues 99 0.1327 0.9789 1 -0.5000 0.9300 0.418
Kinship 102 0.0462 0.9778 1 0 0.9241 0.673
Superior 92 0.3100 0.9810 0.9905 -0.1244 0.9396 0.540
Supporter 102 0.0299 0.9773 0.9905 -0.5000 0.9203 0.449
Financial Ties 104 -3.6E-4 0.9771 0.9905 0 0.9182 0
Communication 104 0.0156 0.9775 1 0 0.9212 0
Membership 96 0.0196 0.9795 0.9905 0.4711 0.9316 0.300
Shared Events 94 0.3390 0.9819 0.9905 0.7667 0.9386 .408
Collaboration 96 0.1799 0.9789 0.9810 0.0758 0.9278 0.448
Monoplex 72 1 1 1 0.1488 1 0.508
TABLE IV: The number of communities and their metrics
in each of the 9 relationships of the Boko Haram Network.
Relationship Comty. ARI Rand Purity Assty. NMI Clr. Adeq.
Friendship 141 8.47E-4 0.8092 1 0 0.5494 0.557
Kinship 137 0.0068 0.8100 1 1 0.5534 0.334
Superior 130 0.0168 0.8108 0.9930 -0.6145 0.5562 0.519
Supporter 140 .0025 0.8094 1 1 -1 0.5505 0.720
Lovers 138 0.0023 0.8093 0.9930 0 0.5489 0.537
Radicalizer 141 8.47E-4 0.8092 1 0 0.5494 0.656
Communication 136 0.0011 0.8087 0.9789 -0.5 0.5418 0.343
Meetings 130 0.0212 0.8114 0.9859 0.8654 0.5550 0.759
Shared Orgs 30 0.8876 0.9675 1 0.2807 0.8881 0.875
Collaboration 134 0.0030 0.8090 0.9718 -0.6 0.5421 0.280
Monoplex 9 1 1 1 0.2987 1 0.584
TABLE V: The number of communities and their metrics in
each of the 10 relationships of the FARC Network.
Thus, the existing community structure in the multiplex
cannot be discovered from any single relationship subnet-
work. However, aggregating some of these relationships into
layers based on their meaning will enable us to get a better
detection of our communities, as we show next.
Relationship Comty. ARI Rand Purity Assty. NMI Clr. Adq.
Classmates 101 0.0187 0.8136 0.8058 -0.0162 0.4961 0.348
Kinship 110 0.0129 0.8279 0.8777 -0.5678 0.5218 0.875
Soulmates 129 -0.0021 0.8274 0.9425 -0.3258 0.5331 0.656
Friends 65 0.0192 0.7960 0.6331 -0.2198 0.4086 0.720
Mentor-Ideo. 126 0.0011 0.8279 0.9281 0.0531 0.5352 0.702
Mentor-Supvr. 103 -0.0030 0.8189 0.8058 -0.3258 0.4773 0.537
Mentor-Tech. 130 -8.76E-5 0.8281 0.9568 -0.1591 0.5405 0.343
Recruiting 117 0.0290 0.8293 0.9281 -0.5524 0.5402 0.759
Meetings 110 0.0596 0.8316 0.9425 -0.1519 0.5578 0.334
Communication 25 0.1307 0.7916 0.5899 -0.1182 0.4055 0.557
Logistical Place 112 0.0334 0.8286 0.9209 0.1648 0.5383 0.210
Operations 85 0.3189 0.8615 0.9425 -0.0466 0.6270 0.519
Logistical Function 93 0.0532 0.8165 0.8130 0.8653 0.4922 0.280
Training 88 0.2766 0.8531 0.9353 0.3860 0.6165 0.589
Monoplex 13 1 1 1 0.0531 1 0.388
TABLE VI: The number of communities and their metrics
in each of the 14 relationships of the Noordin Top Network.
V. METHODOLOGY FOR MULTILAYERED TERRORIST
NETWORKS
We organized the relationships of each of the three
networks into a multilayered network with three layers, each
layer being the union of related relationships. Layers are
based on Kreb’s observation that dark networks are sparse.
The aggregation of similar attributes into layers reduces
sparseness and increases network density for more accurate
community detection [1]. As an example, Noordin network
can be seen in Figure 2, and similar figures can be created
for the other two.
Fig. 2: The Noordin multilayered network: the 14 rela-
tionships organized by layer color with the monoplex O
representing the aggregation of all the relationships.
This allows us to summarize the data to achieve analytical
depth with a user’s goal in mind. In our case, the goal is to
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find a structure for the data, that does not have too many
layers (such as each relationship being its own layer) and
at the same time not just a monoplex network in which
we lose the richness of the data. A secondary goal, is to
group the layers based on the relationships’ correlation, so
that community detection identifies meaningful communi-
ties. Meaningful communities are user-inspired categorical
communities based upon the analytical needs, whose struc-
tural properties enhance the customer’s understanding of the
network in order to achieve the customer’s objective.
In the absence of a customer to drive the objectives, we
use the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organiza-
tion (JIEDDO). JIEDDO’s Attack-the-Network philosophy
to infer the customer objectives. Martin et al. [24] describe
that the mission of JIEDDO is ‘to focus, lead, advocate,
and coordinate all Department of Defense actions in support
of the Combatant Commanders’ and their respective Joint
Task Forces’ efforts to defeat Improvised Explosive Devices
as weapons of strategic influence.” Understanding of these
customer objectives provides context and focus in finding
communities for the purposes of disrupting its ability to
function. For each of the three networks, different attributes
form each of the three layers, working towards identifying
meaningful communities as shown in Table VII.
TABLE VII: The attributes per layer in each network









































Definition 1: Knowledge Sharing Communities (KSC):
Given the Noordin Network and JIEDDO, the Knowledge
Sharing Communities (KSC) are the intersection of Trust,
Lines of Communication (LOC), and Knowledge commu-
nities based on the need to disrupt intra-organizational
coordination in the Noordin Network.
For each of the three layers, we now present on overview
of the obtained data, similar to Tables I-III. The value of V
counts the number of nodes that have degree at least 1.
TABLE VIII: Noordin Network topological characteristics
by layer, V counts nodes of degree greater than 0 in each
layer.
Layer V E AD AWD Di De M ACC APL P
Trust 111 544 7.53 9.80 7 0.07 0.51 0.66 3.10 3
LOC 121 534 6.33 8.83 7 0.05 0.38 0.57 2.92 1
Knowl. 106 1373 22.4 25.9 5 0.21 0.41 0.79 1.93 3
Average 113 817 12.0 14.8 6 0.11 0.43 0.89 2.65 2
Mnplx. 133 2451 22.5 36.9 5 0.17 0.35 0.71 2.13 1
TABLE IX: Boko Haram Network topological characteris-
tics by layer, V counts nodes of degree greater than 0.
Layer V E AD AWD Di De M ACC APL P
Trust 29 31 2.07 2.14 4 0.07 0.56 0.26 2.28 5
LOC 17 34 2.47 4.00 2 0.15 0.33 0.92 1.48 5
Knowl. 21 34 2.95 3.24 7 0.15 0.46 0.56 2.64 4
Average 22 33 2.50 3.13 4 0.12 0.45 0.58 2.13 5
Mnplx. 105 99 3.32 4.50 5 0.08 0.50 0.50 2.42 6
TABLE X: FARC Network topological characteristics by
layer, V counts nodes of degree greater than 0 in each layer.
Layer V E AD AWD Di De M ACC APL P
Trust 32 28 1.68 1.75 3 0.05 0.81 0.39 1.61 8
LOC 130 1614 23.2 24.8 6 0.18 0.51 0.93 2.28 3
Knowl. 13 8 1.23 1.23 2 0.10 0.78 0.00 1.27 5
Average 58 550 8.70 9.26 4 0.11 0.70 0.44 1.72 5
Mnplx. 142 1650 21.5 23.2 8 0.15 0.52 0.91 2.90 1
VI. RESULTS
In Subsection VI-A, we present the metrics of comparing
the community detection in each of the three KSC-driven
layers with the communities of the monoplex. Subsec-
tion VI-B presents a comparison to other possible combi-
nations of the relationships.
A. Results for the Knowledge Sharing Communities
The comparison of the layer community detection to the
one of each relationship subnetwork shows fewer com-
munities per layer, closer to the number of communities
in the monoplex. Also, the communities in the KSC lay-
ers have higher values for ARI, Rand index, Purity and
NMI. These values show that the communities identified
in each layer better represent the community structure of
the monoplex, compared to the communities obtained from
each relationship subnetwork. A practical application better
validate these communities, and that has been considered in
Miller’s thesis [25]
TABLE XI: Boko Haram Networkcomparison: layer against
monoplex.
Layer Comty. ARI Rand Assty. Purity NMI Clr. Adq.
Trust 83 0.5628 0.9848 -0.2709 0.784 0.9555 0.564
LOC 94 0.2000 0.9788 0.3549 0.719 0.9297 0.332
Knowl. 89 0.3994 0.9813 0.6270 0.806 0.9368 0.467
Mnplx. 72 1 1 0.1488 1 1 0.508
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TABLE XII: FARC Network comparison: layer against
monoplex.
Layer Comty. ARI Rand Assty. Purity NMI Clr. Adq.
Trust 118 0.0453 0.8141 -0.5188 0.9860 0.5676 0.818
LOC 21 0.8812 0.9646 0.2935 0.9860 0.8972 0.537
Knowl. 134 3.02E-3 0.8090 -0.6000 0.9718 0.5421 0.787
Mnplx. 9 1 1 0.2987 1 1 0.584
TABLE XIII: Noordin Network comparison: layer against
monoplex.
Layer Comty. ARI Rand Assty. Purity NMI Clr. Adq.
Trust 37 0.2817 0.8316 0.1130 0.7842 0.5865 0.44
LoC 26 0.2990 0.8248 -0.0508 0.7194 0.5718 0.41
Knowl. 40 0.3554 0.8432 0.0892 0.8058 0.6007 0.58
Mnplx. 13 1 1 1 1 1 0.388
There is still a large number of communities in some
layers, as many nodes are still of degree 0 (the count
of nonzero degree nodes is captured in Tables VIII - X).
Running the community detection on just the connected
part of the network would decrease these values, but for
consistency with the rest of our analysis, we kept all the
nodes in each layer.
We investigated the possible correlation between the per-
formance of the community metrics and cluster adequacy.
We found that there is no general pattern identifying that an
increase in cluster adequacy influences the ARPN values in
the three networks.
B. Comparing to possible multilayered networks
To demonstrate the benefit of the KSC communities as
a goal for optimally aggregating network relationships into
layers, we conducted a series of experiments on randomly
configured multilayered graphs from the existing attributes.
For Fig. 3 - Fig 5, we create several choices of multi-
layered networks: a monoplex with 3 layers was created by
partitioning at random the relationships into 3 layers, and
the average of ARPN for 50 randomly sampled networks is
presented as the y-value for the 3L−Avg, which stands for
“the average of ARPM of all 50 3-layers networks”. The
process is then repeated for partitioning the relationships
into four layers (4L−Avg) and five layers (5L−Avg). The
first set of measures are for the KSC layers.
Figure 3 shows that the KSC multilayered network has
the highest ARPN values compared to random partition of
relationships into three, four or five layers, to emphasis that
the grouping of the relationships as proposed in this work
is meaningful.
Figure 4 presents the ARPN values (the sum of ARI, Rand
Index, Purity, and NMI) by layer rather than multilayered
network. The first 9 bars in the bar chart represent the values
for the KSC multilayered network. They are compared
against the average of the ARPN values of 50 randomly
chosen three, four and five-layered networks. The three
layers of each 3-layer network are labeled 3L−L1,3L−L2
and 3L−L3, while the four layers of the 4-layered network
are labeled 4L− L1,4L− L2,4L− L3 and 4L− L4, and
Fig. 3: The network average of the ARPN (the sum of ARI,
Rand Index, Purity, and NMI)for each dark network, against
the average of 50 randomly selected relationships to created
dark multilayered networks with 3,4 or 5 layers, respectively
Fig. 4: The layer ARPN (the sum of ARI, Rand Index,
Purity, and NMI) for each dark network, against the av-
erage of 50 randomly selected relationships to created dark
multilayered networks with 3,4 or 5 layers, respectively
similarly for the 5-layered network. The values of ARPN
over the first layer of each of the 50 networks is averaged
and plotted as the y-value for 3L−L1, and them similarly
for the 2nd layer of each of the 50 networks being plotted
as 3L−L2, and so on.
While the KSC layers, namely Trust, LOC and Knowl-
edge, may not be the absolute best compared against all
cases, nothing is gained by modeling the network with four
or five layers.
This can be seen better in Figure 5 where we present the
average for all layers in a 3,4 or 5-layer network.
Fig. 5: The layer average of the ARPN (the sum of ARI,
Rand Index, Purity, and NMI) for each dark network, against
the average of 50 randomly selected relationships to created
dark multilayered networks with 3,4 or 5 layers, respectively
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We particularly guide our analysis by Noordin’s results,
as it is the most established network of the three, for which
we have the most information about. We consider Boko and
FARC to be less informative, rather presenting an evolving
network.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current research introduces a methodology that cre-
ates multilayered networks from attributed enriched existing
terrorist datasets. We based our work on the analysis of three
datasets that were publicly available: Noordin Top, Boko
Haram, and FARC. Our methodology thus depends on the
observed datasets and literature review of the terrorist net-
works. It may be refined based on analysis of the topology of
more terrorist networks or an augmentation of understanding
of terrorist behavior.
We first use the subnetwork given by each one of the
relationships to create a relationship subnetwork. We com-
pared each relationship subnetwork to the monoplex with
respect to standard network metrics and network’s commu-
nity identification. Some relationship subnetwork proved to
be useful in identifying a community of interest, such as
the community for the Bali 2005 attack. This was identified
using the denseness of the subnetwork’s community, that
captured enough information as described in Section IV.
However, identifying all the communities was not possible
due to the general lack of information that a single attribute
provides.
Based on the existing literature and the reason above,
to enhance the information captured, we then group rela-
tionships into categories that we call KSC layers. We thus
propose a methodology to create 3-layered networks, and
created them for each of the datasets in our possession. We
present an analysis of these KSC layers, and compare them
against other possible multilayered networks that could be
created using the relationships that the data was tagged with.
This analysis shows that no extra information is gained from
building four or five layers.
As future direction, it would be useful to perform a
deeper theoretical analysis of each of the three layers, of
each of the three networks. The goal would be to see if
there are common characteristics, based on which synthetic
generation of dark networks could be possible. Also, more
validation of the communities with a scenario or on data that
is tagged with real communities for this purpose would be
desired.
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